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INTRODUCTION

"Wrong in interesting ways," counts for high praise among aca
demics. Peter Huber's1 stirring new book, Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace, certainly merits acclaim by that standard. The very
subtitle of the book, Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule
the Telecosm, announces the daring arguments to follow. A book so
bold could hardly fail to make some stimulating errors, the most
provocative of which this review discusses. Thanks to his willing
ness to challenge musty doctrines of telecommunications law and
policy, moreover, Huber gets a great deal right.
Law and Disorder in Cyberspace argues at length that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has warped telecom
munications markets, hindered technological advances, and vio
lated constitutional rights.2 Huber blames the inherent nature of
"commission law," which he likens to Communist command
and-control economics: "rigid, slow, and - despite all the earnest
expertise of bureaucrats - ignorant" (p. 8). Reforming the FCC is
thus not an option; rather, it "should shut its doors, once and for all,
and never darken American liberty again" (p. 7).
What would replace the FCC? Market processes and common
law courts. Rather than licensing access to the electromagnetic
spectrum, Huber would sell it, dezone it, and leave private parties
to determine its best uses (pp. 71-76). He regards price regulation
* Assistant Professor, Chapman University School of Law. B.A. 1987, University of
Kansas; M.A. (Philosophy) 1989, Southern Cal.; J.D. 1993, Chicago. - Ed. © 1999 Tom W.
Bell. All rights reserved. The author thanks: Solveig Singleton, John Hasnas, Bruce Benson,
Donna Matias, Marcus Cole, Eugene Volokh, Max More, and members of the telecomreg
<cybertelecom-l@listserv.aol.com> and Cyberia-L <cyberia-l@listserv.aol.com> email lists
for discussing with the author some of the points raised here; Jennifer DePalma, Greg
Schnippel, and Richard Bonenfant for research assistance; and Chapman University School
of Law for supporting his work with a summer research stipend. The author, however,
assumes sole responsibility for this work as submitted for publication.

1. Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; Partner - Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd & Evans; Chair, Telecom Policy and Analysis: a Kellogg Huber Consulting
Group.
2. Although Huber focuses on the FCC, he intends his analysis to apply to its local, state,
and international analogs. Pp. 32-34.
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of telecommunications services as inevitably and thankfully
doomed by protean technologies and increasing competition (pp.
117-29). In place of the universal service subsidy, Huber counts on
market forces to provide cheap basic access just as they already
provide cheap fast food (pp. 130-41). The FCC sets technical stan
dards quickly but incorrectly; "[c]ompetition delivers real standards
more slowly but far more robustly" (p. 161). The telecommunica
tions industry will deliver these and other triumphs, claims Huber,
once it escapes from "commission-law."
To maintain order in the telecosm requires not FCC regulation,
Huber argues, but merely the case-by-case determinations of com
mon law courts. He would, of course, have judges enforce time
tested and general principles of property, contract, and tort law.3
Huber likewise invokes particular common law rules that seem to
suit telecommunications particularly well, such as those relating to
common carriage,4 defamation (pp. 173-77), and privacy.5 More
controversially, he embraces even rules that originated relatively
recently and through legislatures, such as those of antitrust,6 copy
right,7 and First Amendment law (pp. 165-77, 203). These win good
standing in Huber's view because he emphasizes the process of
common law over its substance, demanding merely a law that
"evolves out of rulings handed down by many different judges in
many different courtrooms" (p. 8).
Huber's failure to treat common law as a whole, process and
substance together, opens a rift in the foundation of his text.8
Because Huber need only show that common law - as he under
stands it
will improve on commission law, this theoretical flaw
does not in itself disprove his thesis. But through the fault line
creep a number of troubling errors. Huber accords antitrust law,
abandoned by many of his fellow travelers and inconsistent with
common law proper, inexplicable deference.9 In an analysis aggra
vated by gravely suspect factual claims, Huber promotes mandatory
-

pp.

3. Huber makes this point throughout Law and Disorder in Cyberspace but especially at
4-9, 205-06.
4. Pp. 142-54, 203-04. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text for discussion of

Huber's treatment of common carriage.

5. Pp. 195-98, 204-05. Huber admits, however, that privacy per se has only very shallow
roots in the common law. P. 196. For an argument that the invention of privacy rights by
common law judges and legislatures threatens the more deeply rooted principles of free
speech, property, and contract, see Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical
View of Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 295
(Jan. 22, 1998) .
6. Pp.
antitrust.

6-7, 88-102, 201-02.

7. Pp. 178-88, 204-05.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.

See

See

infra Part III for discussion of Huber's treatment of

infra Part V for discussion of Huber's treatment of copyright.
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interconnection at the expense of property and contract rights.10
His support of copyright law likewise threatens to contradict com
mon law. By contrast, Huber's over-eager application of property
rules to the electromagnetic spectrum overlooks the far better fit
offered by common law trademark principles.11 One might argue
that a future version of the common law, one upgraded and
uploaded to the telecosm, will work so well as to correct these sub
stantive errors.12 One might, but Huber does not.
Tracing the lines of these various faults will illuminate not only
Law and Disorder in Cyberspace qua book, but law and disorder in
cyberspace qua the recurring policy puzzle of our day. Huber's text
thus presents not merely interesting errors, but enlightening ones.
Perceiving that a miasma of incivility hangs over the book, how
ever, some readers may fail to fully appreciate its charms. The next
Part aims at dispelling that somewhat unfair impression.
I.

THE MADNESS IN HUBER'S METHOD

To the credit of Huber's brisk and clever writing, Law and
Disorder in Cyberspace remains interesting even when obviously

right. Few people would describe broadcast television in its heyday
as a bastion of intellectualism. Huber's jibe: "It kept your eyes
warm while you slept" (p. 133). Especially now that the Supreme
Court has struck parts of it down, no one can doubt that the
Communications Decency Act skirted constitutional limits. Huber,
opining prior to Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 13 dryly ob
served that an Internet researcher who "types 'Show Panties' can
hardly be heard to complain about the shock to his sensibilities that
follows" (p. 172). Law and Disorder in Cyberspace fairly bristles
with such witticisms.
Huber's sharp tongue arguably serves Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace less well, however, when he moves from the current
consensus to the fringe of the ongoing debate over the law and pol
icy of telecommunications. Arguing that the F ederal
Communications Commission (FCC) is "unconstitutional, Title to
Title, top to bottom," for example, Huber blames its continued sur
vival on "all the little constitutional issues that swarm out of the
commission like maggots" and distract its critics (p. 200). Huber
portrays the FCC as a shadow from the "night of totalitarian gov
ernment" (p. 5) that descended across Europe in the early 1900s
and places the current FCC in "an Alice-in-Wonderland sort of
10. Pp. 142-54. See infra
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

at Part

IV.
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world, in which the less reason the Queen has to exist at all, the
more corpulent and powerful she becomes" (p. 5).
Most academics regard this sort of talk as shockingly frank or
nearly libelous, but at any rate as too raw for comfort.14 Huber
does not provide a supporting reference for his claim that "the
FCC's different pronouncements on [children's television] should
have been accompanied by a cone-shaped hat, a star-studded cloak,
and the sounding of a Chinese gong" (p. 167). Nor does Huber
footnote his cite to "fairness gnomes at the FCC" (p. 147). Though
ample notes do back up his serious claims, figures, and quotes,
Huber apparently did not write Law and Disorder in Cyberspace
with academic tastes foremost in mind.
Instead, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace aims primarily at
policymakers, mass media commentators, and educated lay people.
That influential audience will find the book both entertaining and
largely convincing. With works like Orwell's Revenge15 and Junk
Science, 16 Huber has already demonstrated his power to shape pop
ular opinion. For that reason alone academics should take care to
understand the arguments in Law and Disorder in Cyberspace.
Huber's ample qualifications also suggest that we take Law and
Disorder in Cyberspace seriously. After earning a Ph.D in engi
neering from MIT, Huber graduated from Harvard Law School and
clerked for the U.S. Supreme Court.17 He ascended to policy wonk
stardom in the mid-1980s by creating for the Department of Justice
an exhaustively documented report on the telecommunications in
dustry, heavily influencing the efforts of the Department and the
federal courts to break up AT&T under the aegis of antitrust law.18
14. See, e.g., Philip V. Permut, Dogma in Cyberspace, 50 FED. CoMM. L.J. 775, 777 (1998)
(reviewing Law and Disorder in Cyberspace) ("Instead of presenting a balanced discussion of
the issues, Huber presents limited and one-sided arguments . . . . "); Stewart Baker, Why
We're All Connected, WAU. ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at A20 (reviewing Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace) ("Huber . . . allows hyperbole to detract from what is otherwise a fascinating
story of politics and technological change. ").
15. PETER w. HUBER, ORWELL'S REVENGE: THE 1984 PALIMPSEST (1984).
16. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE CoURTROOM (1993).
17. See Milo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge: Star of Legal Reform Kindles Controversy But
Collects Critics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992, at Al.
18. PETER W. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE
TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1987) [hereinafter THE GEODESIC NETWORK] . As described by the
court in United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 528 n. l (D.D.C. 1987), modified,
900 F.2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1990), the Department hired Huber to prepare the report for its
triennial review of the line of business restrictions included in the modified final judgment of
the antitrust case that broke up AT&T. The same court later noted that the Department had
relied on The Geodesic Network as "the principal factual basis for its position . . . on the
decree restrictions. " United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1, 5 n.12 (D.D. C.
1988). See also Richard A. Hindman, Comment, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Infor
mation Services Restriction: Applying Tzme-Wom First Amendment Assumptions to New
Technologies, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 471, 502-504 (1989) (describing the influence of The
Geodesic Network).
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Huber coauthored the first full treatise on federal telecommunica
tions law in 199219 and has since then coauthored texts on federal
broadband law20 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21 On
the basis of such.credentials and achievements, Huber has become
a leading figure in telecommunications law and policy.
Most importantly, academics should heed Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace for the substantive ideas that shine through Huber's oc
casionally sharp rhetoric. Even though Huber's tone may wrongly
suggest that he cannot be wrong, his comprehensive critique of tele
communications law and policy does, after all, get a great deal right.
At any rate, we should decently expect outrage from someone who
unfavorably compares Herbert Hoover, father of the FCC, to
Joseph J. Goebbels (p. xiv). That such polemic grates on academ
ics' ears does not prove Huber wrong; it merely proves him spirited.
II.

TAKING THE COMMON

LAW SERIOUSLY

Law and Disorder in Cyberspace rightly criticizes the FCC for
slowing technological progress and infringing on fundamental
rights. Congress shares the blame, both for delegating overbroad
powers to the FCC and for giving it specific and unwise orders. As
Huber explains, however, the FCC's susceptibility to public choice
pressures and its slothful, top-down, and baroque regulatory pro
cess cannot help but render it unfit to make law for the telecosm
(pp. 4-9, 24-62, 95-99, 120-23, 133-36, 146-54, 166-68, 199-206). That
the FCC has thrived even under the allegedly deregulatory
Telecommunications Act of 199622 demonstrates that it will hardly
wither before Huber's call for the Commission's abolition. Still, to
judge from the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate
Commerce Commission, federal agencies that regulate networks
appear uniquely vulnerable to fatal reforms.
Granted, the FCC does a poor job of regulating telecommunica
tions and that it may someday face termination. But can common
law courts do any better? Huber convincingly argues that they can.
"The telecosm is too large, too heterogeneous, too turbulent, too
creatively chaotic to be governed wholesale, from the top down,"
he explains (p. 206). "In a place like that, nothing except common
law can keep up" (p. 8). Huber is not alone in touting the common
19. See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE & PETER HUBER, FEDERAL TELECOMMU·
NICATIONS LAW {1992). Tue authors published an updated version in 1995.
20. See JOHN THORNE, PETER HUBER
LAW (1995).
21. See PETER
REPORT {1996).

W.

& MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, FEDERAL BROADBAND

HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1996: SPECIAL

22. For a descriptive and quantitative assessment of the FCC under the Act, see REGULA·
TORS' REVENGE: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 1-4 {Tom
Bell
& Solveig Singleton eds., 1998).

w.
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law's unique ability to grapple with cutting-edge legal issues.23 He
does, however, evince an unusual appreciation of the common law
as a spontaneous order.24
Huber understands that common law originates not in the hold
ings of any court or courts, but rather in the actual practices of
those who have to live with the law. "Rules evolve spontaneously
in the marketplace and are mostly accepted by common consent.
Common-law courts just keep things tidy at the edges"(p.8). Even
when practical rules face litigation, the common law continues to
grow and develop "out of rulings handed down by many different
judges in many different courtrooms."25 Looping back to the real
world, judicial rules then once more face the acid test of experience.
"The good rules gain acceptance by the community at large, as peo
ple conform their conduct to rulings that make practical sense" (p.
8). Like the telecosm itself, the common law represents a complex,
decentralized, and interlinked spontaneous order.
By attributing only modest powers to courts, Huber's account
contrasts with that of Lawrence Lessig, another prominent advo
cate of applying judicial procedures to new and puzzling legal is
sues. Lessig claims of the Internet "that we are, vis-a-vis the laws of
nature in this new space, gods; and that the problem with being
gods is that we must choose. These choices ...will be made, by a
Court ...."26 To the contrary, like the market place, the English
23. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 207, 216 (1996) ("[M]ake rules clear; create property rights where now there are
none; and facilitate the formation of bargaining institutions. Then let the world of cyber
space evolve as it will, and enjoy the benefits."); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime
for "Cyberspace," 55 U.Prrr.L.REv. 993, 1054 (1994) (comparing various means of regulat
ing the Internet and concluding that "the most flexible, least intrusive rule-making process is
best because communications technology is changing so rapidly. "); Lawrence Lessig, The
Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743, 1752 (1995) (proposing that until we achieve a better
understanding of the Internet "we follow the meandering development of the common
law.").
24. For compatible but more complete analyses of the common law as a spontaneous
order, see RANDY E.BARNETI, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RuLE OF
LAW 114-127 (1998); 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 72-123 (1973); and
BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 20-23, 135-55 (1961). For descriptions of spontane
ous orders generally, see BARNE"IT, supra, at 44-62 and HAYEK, supra, at 35-54.
25. P. 8. See also pp. 4-5 ("The common law evolves from the bottom up. Private action
comes first. Rules follow, when private conflicts arise and are brought to court.").
26. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 875
(1996). Note that Lessig advocates common law processes as merely a temporary expedient
in the face of our current ignorance over how best to regulate the telecosm. See Lessig, supra
note 23, at 1744 (advocating the common law because "what the system of cyberspace regula
tion will need is a way to pace any process of regulation - a way to let the experience catch
up with the technology ..."); Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep, THE lNousTRY STANDARD,
Nov. 20, 1998 (visited Dec. 23, 1998) <http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/
0,1449,2583,00.html?Ol> (arguing against passage of the proposed new Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code, regulating sales on information products, on grounds that "[t]he
best thing is to go slowly - to let parties write the contracts they want and let courts test
them. A practice should develop before laws are passed. ").

1752
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language, or the common law, the Internet arose out of human ac
tion but not human design. No one person or institution can create
or predict such spontaneous orders. Lessig's claim that officers of
the court 27 enjoy god-like power over the Internet thus smacks of
hubris. Huber's account of the modest powers of common law
courts at least avoids that tragedy.
Law and Disorder in Cyberspace errs, however, in overstressing
the process of common law to the detriment of its substantive rules.
While Huber evinces appreciation of contract and property rights,
his paeans to the common law focus on how it works; it "evolves
from the bottom up" (p. 4), "is developed and enforced largely by
private litigants" (p. 5), and "can keep up" with technological
change (p.8). This emphasis on the procedural aspects of common
law leads Huber to embrace legislative inventions that "provide, at
most, a broad, general mandate to develop the law by adjudication
...like the Bill of Rights or the Sherman Act" (p. 8). Huber thus
claims that "[f]or all practical purposes, antitrust law is common
law" (p.6) and - incredibly - credits courts for "doing all the real
crafting of the law of intellectual property" (p. 180).
Common law cannot swallow every rule that Huber would
throw into it, however, and still remain healthy and whole. In the
first place, even the wonders of case-by-case adjudication will not
save some legislation. Consider statutes demanding simply, "prices
shall be fair," or "citizens shall be polite." That courts might over
time develop rules interpreting those broad mandates would not
suffice to render them palatable. So, too, the Sherman Act contin
ues to cast a pall of uncertainty over commerce and to clog courts
with interminable litigation, notwithstanding strenuous judicial ef
forts to give the act an exact, equitable, and efficient meaning. 2s
In the second place, the core principles of common law, its time
tested rules of property, contract, and tort law, can stand only so
much legislative boring before they lose all meaning and collapse in
a mass of contradictions. The multiplication of rules such as anti
trust, copyright, and mandatory interconnection - all of which
Huber supports - thus threatens to leave the common law a
hollow shell. Huber's underappreciation of common law's sub
stance shows even in his plan to create new property rights in the
spectrum, for these new property rights would contravene existing
ones.29 In extraordinary cases, of course, common law may sacri27. Including, until quite recently, Lessig himself. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A Return
Court Role for Ejected Advisor?, WASH. Posr, Sept. 25, 1998, at Fl (describing Lessig's ap·
pointment and removal as a special master in the ongoing Microsoft antitrust litigation).

28. See infra Part ill.
29.

See infra text accompanying notes 90-104.
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fice its core principals for pressing practical reasons.30 As argued
below, however, necessity does not excuse the exceptions that
Huber demands.
ID.

UNDUE TRUST

IN

ANTITRU S T

Law and Disorder in Cyberspace expresses conflicting views of
antitrust law. Huber cannot deny that antitrust lawsuits tend to run
out of control (pp. 91-92, 95-102). After excoriating the FCC, he
admits that "[t]he best of antitrust law degrades into the worst of
commission" (p. 98). Sometimes Huber even seems to think that
we could do without antitrust law. He dismisses fears of "new rob
ber barons" monopolizing the telecosm as "utterly implausible" (p.
6) and argues that "[g]iven half a chance, competition has con
founded natural-monopoly pessimists every time" (p. 103). Yet for
all that, Huber ultimately - and somewhat inexplicably - em
braces antitrust law.
U.S. antitrust statutes have little or n o claim to codifying settled

common law rules.31 This hardly troubles Huber, who accords anti
trust honorary common law status on grounds that courts have
done the hard work of defining its scope. "The [Sherman] Act op
erates only as an enabling statute for economic common law. Anti
trust rules have been developed almost exclusively by judges and
juries, over the course of a century of antitrust litigation" (p. 89).
Few disagree that antitrust law owes a great deal to case-by-case

30. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RUI..ES FOR A CoMPLEX WoRLD 112-27 {1995)
{describing how common law treats special problems arising out of bilateral monopolies, as
in cases of necessity).
31. Commentators continue to' debate the degree to which common law inspired the
Sherman Act. Compare E. THOMAS SuLI.IVAN & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, A.Nrrrn.usT LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 32 {2d ed. 1989) (relating development of common law prior to
enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890 and concluding that "state common-law precedents
...were not necessarily uniform and . . .[e]nforcement against restraints was weak ") with
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act,
74 CAL. L. REv. 266, 280-84 (1986) (arguing that the Sherman Act reflected the majority rule
under U.S.common law barring agreements in restraint of trade). Arthur admits, however,
that toward the end of the nineteenth century a divergent trend, enforcing agreements estab
lishing trusts, had begun to emerge. Id. at 283. Enactment of the Sherman Act of course put
an end to the common law's evolution in that direction.
Regardless of whether the Sherman Act drew on common law precedents, most commen
tators agree that it reached beyond the common law by criminalizing agreements in restraint
of trade and allowing for recovery of treble damages. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND Eco
NOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EvoLUTION OF THE SHERMAN A.Nrrrn.uST Acr 52 {1965);
W.W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST Acr 87-88 {1913); John E.
Lopatka, The Case for Legal Enforcement of Price Fixing Agreements, 38 EMORY LJ. 1, 5
{1989). But see John C. Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,
28 CAL. L. REv. 297, 305 n.27 {1940) {claiming that prior to 1800, price-fixing contracts could
be prosecuted and punished as common law crimes and that private treble damages might
also have been available).
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adjudication.3 2 Many disagree, however, that antitrust law there
fore merits the same respect as common law proper.
The same procedures that work so well with common law's
traditional principles have not redeemed antitrust's vague stat
utes.3 3 Uncertainty about what constitutes an antitrust violation
continues to undermine the rule of law and expose commerce to
undue legal risks.3 4 Furthermore, and in contrast to common law,
the statutory origins of antitrust raise grave doubt about the consti
tutionality of delegating broad lawmaking power from the legisla
tive to the judicial branch.3 5 Mere case-by-case adjudication will
not save antitrust law. Although Huber defends it as "decentral
ized, adaptable, and resilient"(pp. 6-7), one might say the same of
terrorism. Such superficial procedural traits do not alone explain
the triumph of common law. Common law also relies on core sub32. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co. et al., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978)
(noting that the Sherman Act "has been construed to have a 'generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."' (quoting Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v.United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)); Phillip Areeda, Monopolization,
Mergers, And Markets: A Century Past And the Future, 15 CAL. L. REv. 959, 959 (1987)
("The statutes on which it rests are so general that antitrust law shares a great deal with the
common law and is no more to be judged in gross than the law of contracts."); Frank H.
Easterbrook,Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 705, 706 (1982) ("The
Sherman and Clayton Acts authorized the Supreme Court to invent and enforce a law of
restraint of trade .... " (footnotes omitted)). But see Arthur, supra note 31, at 267 ("All the
contending antitrust schools agree on one critical point: that the Sherman Act cannot, and
should not, be given a settled meaning derived from traditional statutory sources. They are
all wrong." (footnote omitted)).
33. See ROBERT H. BoRI<, THE ANrrrn.uST PARADOX 53 (1978) (observing of the
processes that have shaped antitrust that "the law of torts was not built through a process as
unconfined as that ").
34. See Arthur,supra note 31, at 268 ("Antitrust litigation remains notoriously costly and
unpredictable, despite repeated efforts to simplify both the doctrine and the litigation pro·
cess." (footnote omitted)); Alan Greenspan, Antitrust, in AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UN
KNOWN IDEAL 63, 70 (1967) ("[T]he very existence of those undefinable statutes and
contradictory case law inhibits businessmen from undertaking what would otherwise be
sound productive ventures.").
Commentators do not even agree on whether common law processes have at least im
proved antitrust law. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH.
L.REv. 1696, 1705 (1986) (correspondence) (arguing that because "[t]he Sherman Act set up
a common law system in antitrust," judges have given its broad mandate an increasingly
efficient interpretation) and Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv.
471, 488 n.64 (1993) (same) with Arthur, supra note 31, at 270 (arguing that giving courts free
rein to interpret the Sherman Act "has produced neither settled law nor desirable social
policy") and Wtlliam F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 661, 671 (1982) (noting that
even "[a]fter close to a century of antitrust jurisprudence, a vigorous debate continues over
the proper means of furthering the original congressional goals of competition and free en
terprise, " with the necessary result that "uncertainty remains over the measures against
which the social desirability (and hence legality) of various types of business conduct should
be tested " (footnotes omitted)).
35. See BoRI<, supra note 33, at 83 (" Congress cannot delegate to the judiciary the basic
political decisions of the society. "); Arthur,supra note 31,at 268 ("The standardless delega
tion of lawmaking power to unelected judges does not square with traditional conceptions of
the separation of powers required by the Constitution.").
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stantive principles, ones with which the principles of antitrust law,
such as they are, necessarily conflict.36
It thus remains puzzling that Huber does not repudiate antitrust
entirely. He would certainly find himself in respectable - and for
one of his views, sympathetic - company. Richard Epstein has
called for "repeal of the basic statutory framework" of antitrust
law.37 Alan Greenspan jeered, "the entire structure of antitrust
statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and
ignorance."38 Friedrich A. Hayek likewise weighed in against anti
trust legislation, describing its aims as something that "cannot be
achieved without conferring a discretionary and arbitrary power on
some authority, and which therefore must give way to the higher
consideration that no authority should be given such power."39
Contrary to misrepresentations by antitrust's supporters, even
the venerable Adam Smith argued against antitrust law. True, he
famously observed that, "People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices."40 Antitrust advocates all too often qupte that passage
in isolation,41 failing to quote what Smith says immediately thereaf
ter: "It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law
which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty
36. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANAR CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-164 (1974) (aiguing
that scale does not affect the justice of social patterns - they aie justified so long as they
result through just transfers from just holdings); Rudolph J. Peritz, Frontiers of Legal
Thought L· A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263 (discussing the conflict
between common law rights and antitrust law).
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 126. Epstein does, however, offer some favorable com
ments on what he takes to be the "classical" common law rule bairing enforcement of hori
zontal agreements in restraint of trade. See id. at 125.
38. Greenspan,

supra

note 34, at 70.

39. 3 F .A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 86 (1979). See also id. at 85-88
(applying similai analysis to the Sherman Act in particular and denouncing antitrust penal
ties and administrative enforcement). But see id. 86-87 (supporting a civil rule much like the
one that EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 125, ascribes to classical common law).
40. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA
TIONS 128 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F .2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980)
(quoting the first but not the second passage in reversing summary judgment for defendant
accused of an illegal agreement in restraint of trade); Walter Adams & James Brock, Anti
trnst, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 257, 274 (1995)
(same); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The "New Leaming" and the Euthanasia of Anti
trnst, 14 CAL. L. REv. 1515, 1540 (1986) (quoting the first but not the second passage as part
of an extended aigument for more vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws); Alexander J .
Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 F LA. J. !NTL . L . 117, 176 (1995)
(quoting the first passage, eliding the second, and then continuing to quote from Sinith's text '
in defense of a European Cominission ban on cartels); Hairy Frrst, Antitrust Enforcement in
Japan, 64 .ANTITRUST LJ. 137, 140 (1995) (quoting the first but not second passage as proof
that "legal restrictions on cooperation aie necessary").
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and justice."42 Incredibly, they sometimes even excise the latter
quote and claim Smith as one of their own.43
Perhaps Huber stubbornly clings to antitrust law out of some
feeling of gratitude. He initially came to fame with The Geodesic
Network, a report that he prepared for the Department of Justice to
submit as part of its triennial review of the antitrust decree that
broke up AT &T.44 But even The Geodesic Network had scant
praise for antitrust.45 If Robert Bork can so gracelessly leap from
The Antitrust Paradox46 to supporting the current suit against
Microsoft,47 surely Huber can drop his tepid support of antitrust.
When it comes to antitrust, though, nobody has a monopoly on
logic.

42. SMITH, supra note 40, at 128.
43. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Teaching Antitrust Law in Its Second Century: In Search of
the Ultimate Antitrust Casebook, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 189, 220 (1991) (book review) (quoting
the first but not the second passage and labeling Smith the "intellectual grandfather" of the
Sherman Act); Thomas Earl Geu & Martha S. Davis, Work: A Legal Analysis in the Context
of the Changing Transnational Political Economy, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1679, 1688-89 (1995)
(accompanying the elision with the dubious claim that Smith "feared monopoly power far
more than he feared unwarranted government intervention in the market mechanism" (foot
note omitted)); John H. Shenefield, Antitrust - The Next One Hundred Years, 70 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 189, 192 (1996) (quoting the first but not second passage and concluding that Smith's
writing concerned "the need to safeguard [the market's] efficacy").

44. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 528 n.1 (D.D.C.), modified,
900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Notwithstanding Huber's arguments against restrictions
preventing the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) from engaging in information
services, Judge Greene left the restrictions in place. See 673 F. Supp. at 562-67. He did not
remove them until 1991, and then only under pressure from the court of appeals. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991). For an analysis of the impact of
Huber's work in the AT&T litigation, see also Hindman, supra note 18, at 502-04.

45. Huber called some aspects of the breakup decree "almost farcical," THE GEODESIC
NETWORK, supra note 18, at 1.27, described the combination of antitrust enforcement and
FCC rulings as "a large part of the problem," id. at 1.21, and argued in general that technol
ogy played a far more important and effective role than antitrust in shaping the telecommuni
cations industry, id. at 1.21-.35.
46. See BoRK, supra note 33 (offering a comprehensive critique of antitrust law and
policy).

47. See Robert H. Bork, What Antitrust ls All About, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at A19.
Bork defended his work for Netscape Corporation in support of the suit against Microsoft by
drawing a parallel to Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), a case that in
The Antitrust Paradox he said "seems entirely correct." See BoRK, supra note 33, at 345.
1\vo problems plague Bork's argument, however. First, Microsoft does not possess a monop
oly on access to consumers, a factor crucial to the analysis in Lorain Journal. See Holman W.
Jenkins Jr., On Microsoft, Standard Oil and Trustbusters, W ALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at A15.
Second, co=entators agree that Bork misinterpreted Lorain Journal. See Louis Kaplow,
Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 515, 525 n.38 (1985)
(arguing that Bork's support of Lorain Journal contradicts his critique of antitrust's transfer
of-power policy); John E. Lopatka & Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and
the Quest for Foreclosure in Antitrust, 73 T EXAS L. REv. 1255, 1261 n.36 (1995) (criticizing
Bork's analysis of Lorain Journal's market share).
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INTERCONNECTION, COMPETITION, AND
COMMON CARRIAGE

Hard problems do not admit easy solutions. That dictum ap
plies to nearly every topic covered by Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace, but none more so than the relation between intercon
nection, competition, and the common carrier doctrine. Huber he
roically attempts to justify mandatory interconnection 4s as
necessary to foster competition between phone companies, and as
excused by common law's common carriage doctrine (pp. 142-54).
Unfortunately, Huber's account relies on historical inaccuracies
that ultimately deprive it of the power to convince.
Huber supports mandatory interconnection with a cautionary
tale about the origins of the Bell System. In the early 1900s, he
claims, the Bell system crushed its competition and secured its mo
nopoly by refusing to interconnect with independent phone compa
nies.49 Milton Mueller's detailed analysis of early competition in
the telephone industry, however, makes Huber's tale look like
nothing more than that: a tale.50 True, between 1894 and 1901 Bell
strictly refused to interconnect with its competitors.51 But the
independents made their most rapid competitive gains precisely
during that period. They did so, moreover, because of, rather than
in spite of, Bell's ban on interconnection. "Its noninterconnection
policy cut Bell off from the majority of telephone users in undevel
oped areas, and guaranteed its competitors exclusive access to
every exchange built independently of the Bell System," Mueller
explains.52
Just as the independent phone companies thrived by the grace
of Bell's refusal to interconnect, so they began to wilt when, late in
1901, Bell began to connect independents to its toll lines.53 This
new strategy gave Bell a powerful weapon against its competitors.
"It not only provided Bell with connections to small locations, it
48. Mandatory interconnection essentially forces a company owning phone lines to pro
vide its competitors with equal and fair access to those lines and related facilities, thus giving
customers linked to those lines a choice between phone companies. See PETER W. HUBER ET
AL., supra note 21, at 7-12.
49. Bell "offered its superior long-distance service only to its own local affiliates. It re
fused to provide interconnection even to independents that did not directly compete with it.
In rapid succession, independent phone companies either merged with Bell or folded." P. 25.
See also p. 143.
50. See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE (1997). It perhaps
bears noting that Mueller's book probably was issued too late for Huber to weave its history
into his text. Of course, any careful researcher might have discovered the same facts
independently.
52.

See id. at 44-46, 76.
Id. at 76-77.

53.

See id. at 78.

51.
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also removed those exchanges from the independent orbit."S4 A
nascent movement to organize. the independents into a network ri
valing Bell's tried to stop its members from interconnecting with
the enemy, but to no avail.ss Due in large part to an antitrust deci
sion barring the independents from collaborating with each others6
- a fact that should strike Huber as ironic - they could not face
Bell with a unified front.s7 Interconnection created the functional
equivalent of a single phone system: the Bell System.
Huber thus gives the standard account of how interconnection
drives competition, which is to say the wrong account,ss In fact, "it
was the refusal to connect that encouraged robust competition,
because it impelled Bell's rivals to set up lines and exchanges that
duplicated or surpassed Bell's, and thereby allowed for more com
plete competition for subscribers and traffic."s9 Current policies re
flect a woeful ignorance of this history. Huber, for example, salutes
mandatory interconnection, whether imposed by courts wielding
antitrust law or by the FCC enforcing the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, as absolutely vital to creating competition (pp. 150-54).
Mueller's account demonstrates that facilities-based competition the only sort of competition that really works, that endures, and
that improves our telecommunications infrastructure - will thrive
absent interconnection.
More recent history demonstrates, moreover, that mandatory
interconnection does more to promote red tape and lawsuits than it
does competition. The FCC has already generated over 800 pages
of bureaucratese in its attempt to define the terms of mandatory
interconnection.60 While this effort has generated ample litiga
tion,61 it has failed to open local residential markets to competi54. Id.
55. See id. at 78-79.
56. See United States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 130 (N.D. Ohio 1909),
affd., 202 F. 66 (6th Cir. 1913).
57. See MUELL.ER, supra note 50, at 116-17.
58. "Conventional histories present Bell's refusal to connect with the independents as a
harsh and powerful competitive tactic." Id. at 76.
59. Id. at 46.
60. The FCC first devoted 754 pages to Implementation of the Local Competition Provi
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Frrst Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499
(1996). Following this came the Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 13042 (1996), at
eleven pages, and the Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 19738 (1996), at eight
pages. After the Eighth Circuit overturned portions of the Frrst Report and Order, the FCC
issued a forty-three page Third Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 12460 (1997).
61. See, e.g., California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1997), revd. in part sub nom. AT&T
v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 597, 607
(8th Cir. 1998) (affirming the FCC's Third Order on Reconsideration and denying petitions
to review it); and Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1997) (overturning
several provisions of the Frrst Report and Order on grounds that the FCC exceeded its juris-
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tion.62 This will not surprise anyone who takes common law rights
seriously. By interfering with phone, companies' rights to their
property and forcing them to serve their competitors, mandatory
interconnection raises transaction costs, legal claims, and hackles.
Huber excuses mandatory interconnection as consistent with
common law's common carrier doctrine. Again, however, he relies
on suspect history. Among other duties they incur in return for
winning government franchises, common carriers may not discrimi
nate among their customers. As Huber tells it, the common law
never settled whether this duty extends to other carriers. "Several
rulings recognized a general obligation for phone companies to
serve as 'carriers' carriers'; several others didn't" (p. 143).
Although regulatory intervention "completely anesthetized" (p.
144) the common law's deliberations, the AT&T breakup "resur
rected" common carriage "under the rubric of antitrust" (p. 151)
and, says Huber, wisely determined that telephone companies must
interconnect with their competitors. Here as elsewhere, though, an
titrust law contradicts common law processes and principles.
Common law courts had already decisively determined that
telephone common carriers have no general obligation to carry the
traffic of their competitors. By mustering only a single case that so
holds, Huber paints a false portrait of "mixed" holdings.63 At least
ten other courts, from ten other jurisdictions, concur in making this
the majority rule.64 Huber cites one case to the contrary - but
diction in attempting to regulate the price of local telephone service), modified sub nom.
AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct 721 {1999).
62. See Peter Huber, Local Exchange Competition Under the 1996 Telecom Act: Red
Lining the Local Residential Customer {1997) {last modified Nov. 4, 1997) <http://
www.cais.com/huber/redline/files.htm>; Jerry Lucas, Why OSS Interconnection Isn't Happen
ing?, BILLING WORLD, Nov. 1998, at 12; Andrew Kupfer, The Next Big War In Telecom,
FORTUNE, Nov. 23, 1998, at 260; Bloomberg News, Telcos Waver on Residential Service, (vis
ited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,30288,00.html>.
63. P. 242 (citing Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699 (E.D. Wash. 1912)). The
court there stated, in relevant part:
All the authorities agree that at co=on law each telephone company is independent of
all other telephone companies . . . and hence that it is not bound to accord to any such
outside organization or its patrons connections with its switchboard on an equality with
its own patrons; that such connection is a privilege to be accorded only as the result of
private contract or in obedience to some constitutional or statutory provision.
Pacific Tel & Tel Co., 196 F. at 703.
64. See Western Buse Tel. Co. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 248 N.W. 220, 223 (Minn.
1933), ("[P]hysical connection between telephone companies cannot be compelled at com
mon law."); State ex rel Fletcher v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 240 N.W. 252, 255 (Iowa
1932); Oklahoma-Arkansas Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 45 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir.
1930) ("[A]t co=on law, a telephone company owes no duty to make physical connections
with other telephone companies."); Blackledge v. Farmers' Indep. Tel. Co., 181 N.W. 709, 710
(Neb. 1921) (same); Clay County Coop. Tel. Assn. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 190 P. 747,
753 (Kan. 1920); Memphis Tel. Co. v. Cumberland Tel. &Tel. Co., 231 F. 835, 840 {6th Cir.
1916); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 137 P. 1119, 1135-37 (Cal. 1913); Home Tel. Co. v.
Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. 108, 111-12 (Mo. 1911); Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel. &
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admits that it was overruled. 6 5 Summing up a line of jurisprudence
by then long settled, a federal court in 1978 concluded, "At com
mon law, there was no duty to interconnect facilities between carri
ers."6 6 The court added, moreover, that Congress had "in
recognition of this fact" resorted to legislatively overturning the
common law rule in order to force telephone companies to inter
connect. 6 7 In short, the common carrier doctrine does not ratify
mandatory interconnection. Absent that exception to the property
rights that telephone companies presumably enjoy in their lines, it
Tel. Co., 141 S.W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 1911); State ex rel Goodwine v. Cadwallader, 87 N.E. 644,
650-52 (Ind. 1909).
Courts have also described the co=on law default rule by contrasting it to contrary
mandates. See State ex rel Public Serv. Commn. v. Skagit River Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 P. 885,
890-91 (Wash. 1915) (quoting Billings Mut. Tel. Co. v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 155 F.
207, 212 (C.C.D. Mont. 1907)) (noting that a telephone company "probably could not be
compelled to accept or allow" interconnection with its competitors absent constitutional or
statutory law to the contrary); see also Total Teleco=. Servs., Inc. v. AT&T, 919 F. Supp.
472, 479 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[I]nterconnection is required only when the FCC so directs it
. . . ."); Southern Pac. Co=unications Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 975 (D.D.C. 1983)
(same), affd., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Woodlands Teleco=. Corp. v. AT&T, 447 F.
Supp. 1261, 1265-66 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (same).
65. P. 242 (citing Home Tel. Co. v. Granby & Neosho Tel. Co., 126 S.W. 773 (Mo. 1910)),
overruled by Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1911).
Huber does not cite the somewhat embarrassing case of United States Tel. Co. v. Central
Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 130 (N.D. Ohio 1909), affd., 202 F. 66 (6th Cir. 1913). The United
States Telephone court argued in dicta against the majority rule that co=on law imposes no
duty for telephone carriers to interconnect, 171 F. at 140-44, but ultimately based its decision
on the narrower claim that a telephone carrier choosing to interconnect with other carriers
may not discriminate between them, 171 F. at 140, 144-46. Even this would prove controver
sial. See Right and Duty of Telephone Companies to Make Physical Connection of Exchanges
or Lines, 11 A.L.R. 1204, 1208-09 (1921) (discussing conflicting case law).
The United States Telephone court's airy discussion of the former, broader proposition
rightly remained in the sli=est of minorities. Its unconvincing attempt, 171 F. at 142-43, to
distinguish the precedent set in the Express Cases, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Southern
Express Co., 117 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1885) (holding that railroad co=on carriers had no common
law duty to serve their competitors), grossly oversimplifies the cost and complexity, quite
apparent to the present industry, of interconnecting telephone services.
United States Telephone bears another black mark; as noted above, supra text accompany
ing notes 56-57, the court's application of the Sherman Act essentially precluded independent
phone companies from organizing to compete against the Bell System.
66. Woodlands Tel. Corp. v. AT&T, 447 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (S.D. Tex. 1978); see also
Right and Duty of Telephone Companies to Make Physical Connection of Exchanges or Lines,
supra note 65, at 1204 ("The courts are agreed that at co=on law telephone companies
are not subject to control and regulation to the extent of being under the duty of making
physical connection with another company, in the absence of any statute requiring such phys
ical connection."); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of
Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068, 1085 (1997) (calling it "clear under the
co=on law of co=on carriage that a public utility could not be required to sell intercon
nection to another carrier" (footnote omitted)).
. • •

67. See Woodlands, 447 F. Supp. at 1266 (referring to 47 U.S.C. § 201(a), which autho
rizes the FCC to order telephone carriers to interconnect); see also MCI Co=unications
Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("As the legislative history reveals,
Section 201(a) was enacted to permit the FCC to modify the co=on law rule which held
that there was no duty to interconnect facilities between carriers.").
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looks quite doubtful that Huber can enlist the common law in his
campaign for mandatory interconnection.6s
The problem of introducing competition into local markets re
mains vexing. How can we solve it if, as the facts indicate, competi
tion thrives without interconnection, making interconnection
mandatory imposes crushing inefficiencies, and common law allows
phone companies to shun their competitors' traffic? Law and
Disorder in Cyberspace offers no �swer to that question.69 Huber
does, however, offer a revealing apology for mandatory inter
connection: "When government itself erects an enormous statue of
Lenin on otherwise valuable real estate, a case or two of govern
ment explosive at the base may in fact do some good" (p. 153). But
rather than excusing mandatory interconnection, Huber's imagery
suggests that successful reform, in the telecosm as in post
Communist economies, must revive lost property rights. Liberate
telephone companies from mandatory interconnection by letting
them buy back full rights to their facilities. Call it recompense for
regulatory favors received or call it bare extortion; that matters lit
tle. It matters more to buy peace with the retiring regime, restore
real property rights, and make interconnection pay its own way.
v.

THE WRONG IN COPYRIGHT

Law and Disorder in Cyberspace mischaracterizes copyright,
and intellectual property generally, as an agreeable child of the
common law. In fact, legislators bear primary responsibility for the
birth and growth of copyright law. Courts have contributed to its
development primarily by maintaining broad, fuzzy lines around
fair use. To the extent that copyright represents a response to mar
ket failure, it perhaps infringes on common law rights for good rea
son. But infringe it does. If Huber truly respects common law, he
should thus demand that copyright retreat where property and con
tract suffice to encourage creative expression.

In Huber's topsy-turvy account of how copyright and other in
tellectual property laws develop, courts innovate and Congress
comments. "Courts strike the balance case by case. Sometimes
Congress codifies their decisions; occasionally it overturns them.
Most of the time it just lets them be" (p. 179). Huber cites as proof
what courts have done to shape the fair use defense to copyright
infringement (to which the Copyright Act devotes less than one
68. See, e.g., B.F. Ohmes v. General Tel. Co., 384 S.W.2d 796, 799-800 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) (noting that mandatory interconnection would violate telephone company's property
rights); Central N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 92 N.E. 206, 210 (N.Y. 1910) (upholding
contract term forbidding interconnection of telephone systems).
69. But see Solveig Singleton, Mandatory Interconnection: The Leap of Faith, in REGULA·
TORS' REVENGE, supra note 22, at 69 (taking the first two points into account).
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percent of its text)70 and unfair competition qua misappropriation
(to which a leading intellectual property casebook devotes less than
one percent of its pages71) before rashly concluding that courts are
"doing all the real crafting of intellectual property" (p. 180).
Nobody familiar with the voluminous and detailed provisions of the
Copyright Act - including whole sections dedicated to architec
tural works,n reproductions for the disabled,73 and " coin-operated
phonorecord players"74 - or with the likewise eye- glaz ing statutes
on patents,75 trademarks,76 bootlegging,77 semiconductors,78 and so
forth, can take Huber's claim seriously. Congress largely leads the
intellectual property parade, leaving courts to clean up afterward.
Despite exaggerating the overall role that courts play in devel
oping copyright and intellectual property law, Huber does correctly
credit their influence over one comer of copyright: the fair use de
fe nse. But that is hardly cause for celebration. Courts' inordinate
involvement in fair use reflects a deliberately vague statutory sec
tion,79 meandering case law,80 and, as a consequence, recurring
legal battles over copyright's uncertain borders. As Judge Learned
Hand observed, the fair use doctrine " is the most troublesome in
the whole law of copyright."81 Case-by-case adjudication has thus
70. The text of a standard reproduction of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101810, 1001-1010 (1998), runs about 134 pages. See, e.g., SELECTED STATUTES AND INTERNA·
TIONAL AGREEMENTS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT
120-254 (Paul Goldstein et al. eds., 1998). Section 107, which sets forth the fair use defense,
takes up about one half-page.
71. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DoCTRINES 87-94 (4th ed. 1997) (covering misappropriation in 7.5 out of 1047 pages).
72. 17 U.S.C.A. § 120.
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 121.
74. 17 U.S.C.A. § 116.
75. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (1998).
76. Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (1998).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2318-2319A (1998).
78. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914 (1998).
79. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that courts "shall include" its non
exhaustive list of factors in weighing the fair use defense. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1998). As
Congress explained in codifying fair use in § 107, "the endless variety of situations and com·
binations of circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular cases precludes the formulation of
exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
80. See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 209 (describing the "ambulatory" case law on fair
use and concluding that it creates "[l]ack of certainty in the property right [making] protec
tion of intellectual property all but impossible."); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER oN COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A], at 13-154 (1998) (noting that neither the case law nor
§ 107 "offer[s] any firm guide as to when" the fair use defense applies).
81. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). Far
from an outdated dictum, this quotation appears "in nearly every major treatise, casebook, or
law review article on the subject of fair use." Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and
Copyrights, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1532, 1544 n.58.
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hardly done for fair use what it has done for property, contract, and
tort law.
Copyright not only lacks the relatively crisp and intuitive
boundaries of common law's traditional principles; it contradicts
them. Copyright undeniably limits our rights to use our printing
presses or voices in echo of others' or to contract toward similar
ends.82 Huber thus too glibly casts it as good grist for the judicial
mill (pp. 178-79, 204-05). Merely calling copyright "property" does
not suffice to make it congenial company for common law.
Huber admits that copyright had "disreputable origins" (p. 205)
as "an instrument of censorship" (p. 204), but praises it for now
providing a necessary stimulus to the creation and dissemination of
expressive works (pp. 179, 205). He thus adopts the standard view
that copyright prevents the market failure that would follow
unrestrained copying.83 Set aside the fact that no one can quantify
whether copyright law generally helps more than harms original
ity84 and that some doubt it does.85 Even the copyright faithful ad
mit that technological and licensing tools increasingly protect
expressive works better than copyright alone can.86 To guarantee
82. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARv. J.L. & Pu:s. POLY. 817 (1990) (arguing on philo
sophical grounds that copyrights unjustifiably and unnecessarily violate more fundamental
rights); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMuNE L. REv. 261 (1989) (making a similar argument on historical and
economic grounds and reaching the same conclusion).
83. See White-Smith Music Publg. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (explaining that copyright "restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it
there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit," namely, copying
others' expressions at will); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
84. See Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation,
13 HARv. J.L. & Pu:s. PoLY. 867, 906 (1990) (describing questions about the optimality of
copyright as "vacuous"); George Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellec
tual Property: Commentary on Cheung, in 8 REsEARCH IN LAW AND EcoNOMics: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND CoPYRIGHTS 19, 21 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds.,
1985) ("[E]conomists know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare of . . . systems
of intellectual property.").
85. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970) (treating skep
tically the need for copyright's incentives); Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian
Law and Economics Approach, supra note 82 (arguing on economic grounds against copy
right's justification and utility); OFFICE OF TECH. AssESsMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S.,
lNTELLEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELEcrRONICS AND lNFoRMATION (Apr.
1986), (visited Nov. 5, 1997) <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/ns20/alpha_f.html> (ques
tioning the copyright paradigm); Negativland, Fair Use (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://
www.negativland.com/fairuse.html> (questioning private ownership of mass culture's
elements).
86. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 472 (1998) (noting that digital copyright man
agement systems "will allow content owners to insist on greater protection than copyright law
would afford"); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses,
22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 511, 513 (1997) ("In the digital future, access to many works may be
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that federal copyright law continues to dictate information policy
and - especially - that the fair use free ride keeps rolling, they
demand special limits on property and contract.87 Thus exceptions
become entitlements. Because he overestimates copyright and
underemphasizes common law rights, Huber risks endorsing such a
scheme. He does not address the issue, however, leaving hope that
when information markets outgrow their weaknesses, Huber will
see the need to liberate them from copyright law's smothering
embrace.ss
VI .

SPECTRUM REFORM CoNs1smNT

WITH

COMMON LAW

Law and Disorder in Cyberspace correctly diagnoses the collec
tivist ills afflicting wireless communications policy in the U.S. and
prescribes a common law cure that would - do much good. But
Huber's preferred treatment - ownership in fee simple of the spec
trum - contains a dangerously high dose of property rights. Comavailable only to people who 'contract' in advance . . . . If these 'licenses' are uniformly
enforceable, all of the users' rights of copyright will soon disappear."); Michael J. Madison,
"Legal-Ware": Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1025, 103476 (1998) (describing current and future uses of shrink-wrap licenses); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) ("[S)uch
technological fences would raise the specter of all-consuming copyright owner control.");
David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 543, 608
(1992) ("[S)oftware license terms fashion extra-statutory super-copyright."); Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93
MICH.L. REv. 1570, 1609 (1995) (book review) ("[U]biquitous agreements impose a series of
restraints on 'licensees' - who look, act, and feel like buyers - that push the limits of
intellectual property policy and sometimes . . . exceed them."); see also Ann Okerson, Who
Owns Digital Works?, SCI. AM., July 1996, at 80, 82-83 (noting that cash-strapped library and
education groups foresee a "nightmare future" where "nothing can be looked at, read, used
or copied without permission or payment"); Mark Stefil:, Trusted Systems, Sci. AM., Mar.
1997, at 78, 78 ("Some legal scholars believe . . . that publishers will be left with too much
power, undercutting the rights and needs of consumers and librarians.").
87. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 86, at 558-59 (arguing for preemption of property and
contract rules that threaten certain information-sharing practices); Karjala, supra note 86, at
528-33 (arguing for preemption of copyright licenses that lack "special relationship" estab
lished through "true bargaining"); Madison, supra note 86, at 1130 ("[C)ertain forms of li
cense and license terms . . . prevalent in the market . . . should be preempted by the
Copyright Act." (footnote oinitted)); Netanel, supra note 86, at 363 (arguing for a view in
which "the liinits to copyright's duration and scope represent the outer bounds not only of
copyright protection, but also of other forms of private control over publicly disseininated
expression"); Rice, supra note 86, at 614 (calling for preemption of any contract that limits
access to an expressive work "where the effect is to secure rights in that expression which are
greater than, equal to, or supplemental of those which Section 106 [of the Copyright Act]
secures"); Merges, supra note 86, at 1613 (proposing for copyright law "a new policing con
cept: a prohibition against blanket imposition of a contract term on essentially the entire
licensee population." (footnote oinitted)).
88. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L.REv. 557, 614-18 (1998) (advocat
ing that those who rely on methods subject to preemption have the opportunity to exit from
copyright into common law).
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mon law offers a better, more gentle solution: treating rights to the
spectrum like rights to trademarks.
Law and Disorder in Cyberspace ably summarizes the doleful
history of wireless communications regulations, from early steps
toward establishing a common law right against broadcast interfer
ence, to Congress's abrupt nationalization of the spectrum in the
1927 Radio Act, to the FCC's long use of licensing to tightly limit
who might broadcast what (pp. 27-30, 40-48). Events have in recent
years taken a happy tum towards more liberal access to wireless
communications, which Huber credits to technological advances,
the government's thirst for revenue from spectrum auctions, and
even FCC forbearance (pp. 63-71). Because title to the spectrum
remains in the government's name and in the FCC's trust, however,
Huber remains dissatisfied. "The federal government must priva
tize in the 1990s what it nationalized in 1927," he argues (p. 72).
Law and Disorder in Cyberspace thus counsels the federal gov
ernment to first divide the electromagnetic spectrum by frequency
and geographic area and then sell it to the highest bidders. "To
keep for how long? Forever. ·Just like land" (p. 73). Largely for
practical reasons, incumbent licensees would automatically win title
to the spectrum they have been using. Once property rights have
been thus assigned, questions about who owns the spectrum and
how they use it would be left for the downstream market to deter
mine. Courts would resolve disputes over interference in the same
way that they settle disputes over trespass to real property (pp. 7374). This approach would certainly improve on the current system
of allocating rights to the spectrum and it has justifiably found sup
port among those who, like Huber, appreciate the power of free
markets and private property.s9
In their rush to paint the spectrum in the image of real property,
however, Huber and his fellow reformers have overlooked the fact
that their plan threatens existing property rights. Suppose, for ex
ample, that on your land you used, for private wireless communica
tions, a frequency owned by a local radio station. If your use did
not interfere with your neighbors' reception of that station, on what
grounds could the supposed owner of the frequency object to your
use? The example is not as farfetched as one might at first think.
Similar facts have already given rise to a dispute under the current
89. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 138-48 (1983); John R.
Williams, Free the Spectrum: Market-Based Spectrum Management, in REGULATORS' RE
VENGE, supra note 22, at 101; Arthur S. DeVany et al., A Property System for Market Alloca
tion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1499 (1969); Evan R. Kwerel & Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An
Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 221 (1975); Matthew
L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1014-15
(1989); Richard W. Stevens, Anarchy in the Skip Zone: A Proposal for Market Allocation of
High Frequency Spectrum, 41 FED. COMM. LJ. 43 (1988).
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licensing system, under which the federal government claims title to
the airwaves.90 Households of all sizes increasingly put wireless
communications to personal use in garage door openers, cordless
phones, baby monitors, and so forth. New open access91 and spread
spectrum92 technologies can allow one frequency to simultaneously
carry many signals without interference, thus largely obviating the
justification for granting titles to entire blocks of the spectrum.
Assigning property rights to the spectrum would thus not only
conflict with existing property rights, but do so unnecessarily. A s
Ronald H. Coase observed o f a market i n spectrum, " what would
be sold, is the right to use a piece of equipment to transmit signals
in a particular way. O nce the question is looked at in this way, it is
unnecessary to think in terms of ownership of frequencies or the
ether."93 A t radio's birth, legal theorists tried to define the right to
transmit in terms of a variety of common law rights other than
property.94 Their brief and tentative discussions,95 nullified when
the federal government nationalized the airwaves and forgotten by
reformers :fixated on the property model, now merit a revival.
Trademark law offers the most promising model for defining a
common law right to use the spectrum. Consider in brief the paral
lels: a trademark protects not a property right per se,96 but merely
the right to prevent others from using in commerce marks likely to
cause confusion97 (like a bar on interfering signals). Trademark
users can establish their rights merely by usage G ust as one might
homestead the airwaves) or by registering their marks with state or
federal authorities98 (as one might register claims to spectrum use).
90. See Joe Gardyasz, Agency Tries to Silence Farmer, BISMARCK Trus., May 8, 1998, at
Al {describing FCC efforts to stop Roy Neset, a North Dakota farmer, from making unli·
censed broadcasts for his personal use despite its admission that he was not interfering with
any existing stations' signals).
91. See Eli M. Noam, Beyond Auctions: Open Spectrum Access, in REGULATORS'
REVENGE, supra note 22, at 113.
92. See David R. Hughes & Dewayne Hendricks, Spread-Spectrum Radio, Sci. AM., Apr.
1998, at 94.
93. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 33 {1959).
94. Id. at 31 {"The problem of radio interference was examined by analogy with electric
wire interference, water rights, trade marks, noise nuisances" and even a case concerning the
right to frighten wild ducks).
95. See James Patrick Taugher, The Law of Radio Communication with Particular
Reference to a Property Right in a Radio Wave Length, 12 MARo. L. REv. 179, 310-12 {1928)
{discussing trademark as one of four co=on law theories that might define the right to
broadcast); STEPHEN DAVIES, THE LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION 123-24 {1927) (treating
the same topic even more briefly).
96. See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETI·
TION § 2.06 {3d ed. & Supp. June 1995).
97. See 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETI·
noN § 23.01[1] {3d ed. & Supp. June 1995).
98. See 2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETI·
noN §§ 16.1-16.4 {3d ed. & Supp. June 1995).
•
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Trademarks last only so long as they remain in use99 (so, too, should
spectrum rights forbid hoarding).
This suggestive argument leaves a good many interesting ques
tions unanswered, of course.100 It surely stands for something, how
ever, that the only U.S. court to find a common law right to
broadcast free of interference101 analyzed the problem in terms of
good will, unfair competition, and trade names102 - notions pecu
liarly linked to trademark law - and upheld not a simple property
right but rather "a particular right or easement in and to the use of
said wave length . . . . "103 Huber, like other property-oriented
reformers, cites the case but misconstrues its holding (p. 29). Com
mentators and courts alike must therefore work harder at finding
appropriate common law answers to the question of allocating
rights to use the spectrum.104
VII.

THE FUTURE · OF COMMON LAW

Although Law and Disorder in Cyberspace says much about
how common law might improve the telecosm, it says nothing about
how the telecosm might improve common law. That omission,
while perhaps understandable, proves unfortunate for Huber's
thesis. As this review has described, several small mistakes follow
from the one big mistake of Law and Disorder in Cyberspace, that
of elevating the process of common law above its substance. But
there remains an argument - ignored by Huber and admittedly
speculative - that perhaps could have excused the book's bias.
The argument concludes that the telecosm might so improve com
mon law processes as to fully correct for any substantive deficien
Cies. To reach that conclusion in due speed will require us to take,
with the reader's pardon, some rather big steps.
·

Common law processes are not what they used to be. From the
apparent virtues of common law's traditional rules, many commen
tators have surmised that case-by-case adjudication encourages the
generation of efficient rules.105 But exactly how it does so remains
99.

See id. § 17.03.

100. For example, should spectrum rights face the same restrictions on assignment in
gross that apply to trademarks? How well would the trademark analogy protect the right to
transmit via a CB radio or low power device? Should state and federal authorities share the
power to register rights to use the spectrum, as they do the power to register trademarks?
101. See Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. 1926),
reprinted in 68 CoNG. REc. 216 (1926).
102. See Tribune, 68 CONG. REc. at 216-17, 219.
103. Tribune, 68 CoNG. REc. at 217 (emphasis added).
104. The reviewer has begun to draft his own contribution to the effort, tentatively titled,

Quality Signals: Allocating Rights to the Electromagnetic Spectrum by Analogy to Trademark
Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
105. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law ·with
out the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL Snm. 139 (1980); John C. Goodman, An Economic
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subject to great controversy.106 More importantly, it looks uncer
tain whether modem judicial processes can preserve common law's
core principles, much less generate new rules on a par with the
old.107
The principles of common law or iginated in the competition
b etween courts vying for litigants' business. For much of the com
mon law's development, court fees generated more regular108 and
prob ably greater109 income for judges than their salaries did. That
compensation structure created incentives for the administration of
justice quite different from - and arguab ly b etter than - those
that currently drive the common law. Adam Smith, praising the
effect of court fees, describ ed " each judge endeavouring to give, in
his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy, which the
law would admit, for ever y sort of injustice. "110 Judicial competi
tion gave rise to many of common law's core principles, such as, for
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); R.
Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD, 397,
404 (1981).
106. Compare, e.g., Priest, supra note 105, at 66-75 (arguing that inefficient rules face the
greatest probability of being overturned because they are litigated most often) with Robert
D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1690-94 (1996) (arguing that
common law tends toward efficiency because courts borrow from outside the legal system
social norms that tend toward efficiency), and Landes & Posner, supra note 105, at 284 (argu
ing that commentators have "overstated the tendency of a common law system to produce
efficient rules" and concluding that "our finding that the public courts do not automatically
generate efficient rules is disappointing, since it leaves unexplained the mechanism by which
such rules emerge . . . .") .
107. See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future,
64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1167, 1170-71 (1997) (arguing that common law has for several decades
been tending toward inefficiency); see also Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of
Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994) (describing how lawyer interest
groups cause the modem common law system to generate inefficient rules).
108. Although English judges began earning salaries as early as 1268, these "were by no
means regularly paid," 1 Sm WILLIAM HoLDSWORTii, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252
(A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1956). Their salaries were often years in arrears, id. at
252 n.9, 253, and remained irregular at least until the mid-seventeenth century, id. at 252.
109. "Probably in the Middle Ages this source of income was the most valuable," and
seems always to have constituted "a considerable sum." Id. at 254. When in 1826 judges
were denied the right to earn income from fees, their salaries were more than doubled, ap
parently to compensate for the loss. Id. at 255.
Court fees indirectly created an additional and even greater source of income for judges,
who had the power to sell court offices that derived income from fees while requiring few or
no duties. "By the end of the seventeenth century . . . this patronage had actually become
more lucrative than all the other sources of income put together." Id. at 255.
110. ADAM SMITH, supra note 40, at
JurusPRUDENCE 423 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,

679. See also ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON
1978) ("During the improvement of the law of
England there arose rivalships among the several courts."):
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example, the contract doctrine allowing suit upon purely executory
promises.111
Competition between entire court systems likewise drove the
development of common law. One can hardly overestimate the ex
tent to which struggles between ecclesiastical and royal courts influ
enced the Western legal tradition . 1 1 2 Similarly, when the
jurisdiction of royal courts expanded to swallow local and feudal
courts, "a substantial part of property law and tort law which had
previously been a matter of local custom became a matter of royal
law . . . . "113 The Law Merchant offers the most relevant example
for present purposes, however. Its specialized courts arose during
the late eleventh and twelfth centuries to serve the international
trade then growing throughout Western Europe.114 Common law
courts eagerly absorbed the sophisticated rules developed by the
Law Merchant - as well as the fees of its former clients.115
Competition between judges and court systems thus appears to
have played a vital role in generating the common law's substantive
rules.116 Huber might well take heart in the notion that good proce
dures can, at the extreme, remedy poor principles. It remains only
to argue that the telecosm, by bringing instant international com
merce to our fingertips, will initiate a legal revolution akin to the
one that gave rise to the Law Merchant.
Several commentators have already predicted that the private
resolution of Internet disputes will generate a unique body of com
mon law.117 Some have more specifically analogized that process to
111. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW 405-11
(1929) (describing how competition between courts gave rise to the action of asswnpsit); see
also id. at 144-45, 248-49 (describing "invention of legal fictions" in "warfare" between courts
that lasted from the middle ages through the seventeenth century); id. at 382-83 (discussing
how rivalry between courts shaped the law of uses and trusts); id. at 394 (discussing how
competing courts developed law of real property mortgages).
112. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADmON 165-294 (1983).

Id. at 456.
See id. at 333-35; see also BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 30-35 (1990).
115. See BENSON, supra note 114, at 60-62.
116. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 910-11 (1992):
113.

114.

Many of [common law's] principles originated with the competitive law merchant that
preceded the growth of the common law. Many more were determined in an era when
common-law courts competed for legal business with other legal systems and therefore
had a far greater incentive than today to be sensitive to the expectations of both parties.
With this as its origin, I suggest that the correspondence between common sense and
common law is no coincidence.
117. See Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott III, Shaping New Legal Frontiers:
Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 Omo ST. J. ON D1sP. REsoL. 711, 721 (1998) (claiming
of private adjudication of Internet disputes that "over time it could develop a common law of
cyberspace. This cyberspace law would take into account customs of Internet users, and it
would have the ability to adapt to new customs as the Internet grows and develops" (foot
note omitted)); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Ap-
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the Law Merchant.118 None, however, appears to have gone on to
argue that the telecosm will, by encouraging the rise of new and
specialized courts, create judicial competition akin to that originally
responsible for common law's core principles. Law and Disorder in
Cyberspace does not make the argument, at any rate, leaving its
treatment of common law split between process and substance.
CONCLUSION

Law and Disorder in Cyberspace presents a thesis revolutionary
in the truest sense of the word: it argues for overthrowing the ex
isting corrupt order by returning to earlier, better, more fundamen
tal values. So defiant a book naturally reads, to quote its dust
jacket, as a "polemic." Yet Law and Disorder in Cyberspace merits
serious attention from scholars and policy wonks. Huber makes a
strong case for abolishing the FCC and relying on common law to
rule the telecosm. The flaws of Law and Disorder in Cyberspace
make it not irrelevant, but all the more interesting.
Most of the problems with Law and Disorder in Cyberspace
flow from its relative disregard for the substance of common law.
Huber forcefully argues that case-by-case adjudication cannot fail
to improve on the FCC's slothful, politicized, top-down regulation.
But he too readily embraces a variety of rules that would both clog
common law processes and contradict common law principles.
Huber promotes antitrust for no apparent reason and mandatory
interconnection for plainly wrong ones. He overrates the limited
and none too praiseworthy role that courts have played in shaping
intellectual property law and glosses over copyright's uneasy rela
tionship with common law proper. In contrast, Huber rashly ex
tends property rights to the electromagnetic spectrum allocation,
ignoring a better fit modeled on trademark rights. Perhaps Huber
could overcome such criticisms by claiming that the telecosm will so
improve common law processes as to ensure that they correct sub
stantive errors. Law and Disorder in Cyberspace does not explore
that defense, however, leaving time alone to test its truth.

proach - Potentia� Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 175, 205
(1998); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self
Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance In Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & Pus. PoLY. 475, 544 (1997); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1387-91 (1996).
118. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace, " 55 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 993, 1019-21 (1994) (describing suggestive parallels between conditions giving rise to
the Law Merchant and those obtaining in cyberspace); Johnson & Post, supra note 117, at
1389 ("Perhaps the most apt analogy to the rise of a separate law of Cyberspace is the origin
of the Law Merchant . . . .").

